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public–private partnerships
The public sector—government—has not always been 
successful in providing adequate services, especially in 
poorer, more remote areas. Since the 1990s, the pri-
vate sector has been used to deliver financing oppor-
tunities and improve services in conjunction with the 
public sector through public–private partnerships. 
Water and sanitation has been one sector addressed 
globally through different types of these contractual 
agreements.
throughout the world, the public sector is principally responsible for water and sanitation services, operating 
more than 90 percent of the piped networks in developing 
countries. On the whole, however, the public sector has not 
succeeded in improving water and sanitation access and 
quality in many parts of the world, especially for poorer 
people, and in more remote areas. Such operators typically 
suffer from various problems, including low service cover-
age and quality of service, artificially low tariffs, billing 
and collection difficulties, lack of capacity, lack of capital 
investment, lack of operation and maintenance and poor 
consumer relations. In the 1990s, public–private partner-
ships (PPPs) began to be promoted as a means to deliver 
financing for investments and efficiency improvements. 
Infrastructure (telecommunications; electricity genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution; natural gas transmis-
sion and distribution; transport; and water) accounted for 
half of privatization/PPP proceeds in developing countries 
in 1990–2003 (ADB 2008). By 2000, private operators 
were serving 93 million people in developing countries 
(Marin 2009); high profile projects were undertaken in 
Latin America as well as in megacities including Buenos 
Aires, Argentina; Manila, the Philippines; and Jakarta, 
Indonesia.
What is a public–private partnership?
While there is a large volume of literature relating to pub-
lic–private partnerships, there appears to be no hard and 
fast definition. The predominant understanding of pub-
lic–private partnerships is a general one: public–private 
partnerships serve to implement projects in which there is 
some form of collaboration between the public and private 
sectors; they also finance or otherwise increase resources 
for the sector (resources include people, skills, expertise, 
knowledge, technology, equipment, facilities, and spare 
capacity) in order to expand capabilities.
In general, public–private partnerships have a number 
of common features:
A formal or informal agreement. The majority of PPPs •	
are governed by a formal contract, which is generally 
understood to be a legally binding written agreement. 
But public–private partnership is also used to describe 
other types of less formal agreements between govern-
ments and private organizations. These “agreements” 
spell out the responsibilities of each party but stop short 
of being legally binding arrangements.
A public- and a private-sector entity. There is a lack of •	
consensus over the definition of what constitutes the 
private sector in the context of PPP arrangements. For 
example, a private partner might be a private company 
(international or local), an informal service provider 
(international or local), a nongovernmental organization 
(NGO), or a community-based organization (CBO). 
The partnership may be a bilateral contractual arrange-
ment or a multiparty arrangement.
An outcome. PPPs are intended to ensure that ser-•	
vices are provided in the most efficient and effective 
ways possible and usually through joint realization. For 
public–private partnerships • 393
example, the private sector typically contributes design, 
construction, operation, maintenance, finance, and risk 
management skills while the government is responsible 
for strategic planning, regulation, and so on. This sets 
PPPs apart from other forms of public–private interac-
tion, such as when a private-sector operator or an NGO 
has essentially been subcontracted to provide a service 
(or services) independently.
A degree of risk borne by the private-sector entity. Most •	
definitions of PPPs usually refer to the degree of risk borne 
by the private sector. There is a distinction between mod-
els of PPP with low private-sector risk, such as service and 
lease contracts, and those with significant private-sector 
risk, such as concession contracts (Sohail 2003).
ppp Models
There are a number of different types of PPPs in existence. 
The following is a typical categorization of different con-
tractual arrangements for private-sector participation, but 
several hybrid arrangements are also possible.
Service Contracts
Under a service contract, the government pays a private 
entity to perform specific tasks. Service contracts are a 
long-established practice used for routine operations (meter 
reading or leak detection), engineering works, and the lay-
ing of pipelines.
Management Contracts
Management contracts are contractual agreements between 
the government and a private partner under which the pri-
vate partner is given the responsibility for day-to-day 
management of an enterprise in exchange for a fee; the 
government, however, retains financial and legal respon-
sibility for delivery of services. These are arrangements 
in which a municipality or local government purchases 
management services from a company.
Leasing or Affermage
Under this model, the government delegates management 
of a public service to a company in return for a specified 
fee, commonly based on the volume of water sold, while 
ownership of assets remains with a holding company oper-
ating for the government.
Concessions
This arrangement usually gives the concessionaire (the 
owner or operator) a monopoly service provision for 
a fixed period of time, during which the concession-
aire also assumes any significant investment risk. The 
model of large concessions has worked in some places, 
but its suitability to most developing countries has been 
questioned.
Why use ppps?
Public–private partnerships are pursued as a way to lever-
age knowledge, resources, and capabilities to achieve pub-
lic goals. PPPs are often used to address non- revenue water 
reduction (reducing the amount of water “lost” before it 
reaches the customer and is paid for), billing collection, and 
labor productivity. While the early models of partnerships 
focused on the gains from private financing, the most suc-
cessful PPPs in the water and sanitation sector have largely 
been based on public financing (leases or hybrid programs) 
combined with private-sector efficiency. Thus rather than 
improve access to private financing, PPPs have been used 
to improve the financial viability of the water and sanita-
tion operators through service quality, access expansion, 
and increasing cash flow for investment and creditworthi-
ness. In the long term these improvements should trans-
late into broader, more equitable, efficient, affordable, and 
effective delivery of services. Nevertheless, PPPs may not 
be selected as an option to improve service delivery on 
ideological grounds or the basis of public service ethos 
(Sohail 2002a).
innovative solutions
Access has improved by expanding the water 
network to poor neighborhoods that were 
previously unserved, as in Queenstown, South 
Africa; La Paz–El Alto, Bolivia; Manila; and 
Buenos Aires. In Queenstown, a much smaller 
PPP covering a population of 22,000 was amended 
to include an extra 170,000 inhabitants of 
predominantly low-income areas (Sohail 
2005). The renegotiation of existing con-
cession contracts operated in Manila 
and Buenos Aires led to affordable 
connection charges for lower-income 
consumers—benefiting 400,000 in 
Manila and 260,000 in Buenos Aires. 
Connection-fee cross-subsidies were used 
in Buenos Aires; reduced connection costs 
through distant meter locations and the use of 
community labor led to 90 percent cost 
reductions in water tariffs for the poor 
in Manila (Nickson and Franceys 2001). 
Nonetheless, there is little evidence of cov-
erage extended to the urban poor as a result of 
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larger scale, formal private-sector compa-
nies in PPPs, at least in the initial stages 
of the contract (Sohail 2004).
In 2000, 80 percent of the water PPP 
market in developing countries was dom-
inated by five international water com-
panies. Since 2001, however, most new 
contracts have been signed by private 
operators from developing coun-
tries (these account for 90 percent of 
the growth in the number of people 
served by PPP projects). By 2007, local 
private water operators served more than 
67 million people; some international opera-
tors have also transferred their existing con-
tracts to local investors (Marin 2009, 9).
Water operator partnerships (WOP) have 
been promoted by the U.N. since 2006 as a way 
to strengthen local water and sanitation services 
by sharing expertise through training and techni-
cal assistance. WOPS are defined as “cooperation 
between water operators,” on a “not-for-profit” basis 
(UNSGAB 2006, 3). Some may not classify them 
as PPPs, but they are partnering arrangements: the 
receiving partners are always public undertakings (water 
and sanitation utilities, drainage and sewerage companies, 
or wastewater organizations), but their collaboration part-
ners may be well-performing public (foreign public utilities 
or local public utilities) or private operators (international 
private operators or local private operators), small-scale 
water and sanitation service providers, or community-
based organizations.
Small, often informal service providers play a significant 
role by filling in the gaps in service delivery. These service 
providers, however, are often not officially recognized or 
involved in PPPs. The potential for these small service pro-
viders in PPPs has not been accurately assessed.
controversies
In developing countries, PPPs haven’t met initial expec-
tations: there have been a series of highly publicized con-
tract cancellations, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in 
Latin America among concession programs. Doubts still 
remain over the suitability of PPPs both for improving 
the performance of water utilities and extending access 
to water and sanitation to the unserved in developing 
countries.
Cherry-picking is a particular danger with PPPs, that is, 
the sites that are most attractive to private investors—large 
cities in countries with large economies and a large middle 
class—will be selected rather than areas with the greatest 
need. Poor areas and people are often seen as unprofitable 
and difficult to serve, which means that connections and 
extension of services are typically not made to residents 
with insufficient funds, insecure tenure, and those living 
in difficult-to-reach locations such as rural areas (Sohail 
2002b).
The pricing of services in general and the design of tar-
iffs for service provision in particular is a significant issue. 
In most cases, PPP projects have been accompanied by tar-
iff increases (due to more realistic pricing or greed, depend-
ing on one’s point of view) that put services beyond the 
reach of the poor. PPPs may also be accompanied by mas-
sive lay-offs, depending on extent of “over-staffing.”
Some services are less attractive for private-sector 
involvement due to their more complex nature; neglect in 
the area of sanitation is a significant trend that has been 
noted with PPPs. This could be the case for many reasons: 
sanitation facilities are often more complex and expensive 
than water facilities; the demand for the service often does 
not exist; there is an unwillingness by users to pay; or there 
may be unnecessary bureaucracy or regulation that con-
strains service delivery (Sohail 2002c).
PPPs require significant government capacity to be 
effectively managed, however, such capacity is often lack-
ing. Local government officials need to learn not just how 
to strategically manage PPPs, but also how to renegotiate 
and implement them to achieve their objectives.
successes of ppps
PPPs haven’t always worked, but successes have often 
received much less publicity than failures. PPPs tend to 
work best for those who can pay and who live in places 
where the overall demand makes the provision of services 
a viable option. If a PPP is to improve access and ser-
vice delivery for the poor, then this has to be specified in 
the contract documents that will ultimately be the basis 
for engaging the private sector. Very few PPP contracts 
contain explicit pro-poor references. Bidding procedures 
and contract design should allow sufficient flexibility for 
innovative solutions to water and sanitation supply, such 
as lower-cost or alternative technology (for example, pipes 
at lower depth or condominium sewerage), and flexible 
billing arrangements as well as payment options, par-
ticularly with respect to poor neighborhoods (Hemson 
and Batidzirai 2002). Multipurpose contacts, such as the 
combined water and electricity concession in Casablanca, 
offer opportunities to optimize the demand and sources 
and should be explored further. In Casablanca the larger 
electricity side of the services was subsidizing investment 
in the smaller water division (Hall, Bayliss and Lobina, 
2002).
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Developing a long-term business model for PPPs to 
work within a given context is a challenging activity and 
requires further exploration.
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